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ABSTRACT
The way in which we recognize, define, and promote freedom in our society can be
deeply valuable. It can lead to important political answers and help identify rights and their
nature. My intention is to consider the relationships among three conceptions of freedom. I
believe that discussions of freedom which are relevant to political philosophy are necessarily
normative. By this I mean that I am not discussing purely descriptive concepts of freedominstead I am speaking of freedom which can be considered desirable, for this is what truly
matters. Freedom to murder, for example, is freedom in the descriptive sense but not in the
normative sense.
Two major concepts of liberty are positive and negative, which are often recognized as
distinct and antagonistic conceptions of freedom. While I believe their distinction can be
beneficial in identifying the way in which freedom should be understood, I believe that liberty
should ultimately be recognized as a single concept. I argue positive and negative liberty are not
antagonistic, but rather they are complementary conceptions of a single concept, which are
sufficient to account for that concept so far as it is a normative concept relevant to political
philosophy. My main focus is on my assertion that republican freedom is not needed as a third
conception in the view of liberty which I endorse. This is not because domination is not freedom
reducing, but rather because once negative and positive liberty are working together in a
complementary system, there is nothing which republican freedom can bring to the table which
is not already there. Further, holding republican freedom above negative and positive freedom is
harmful to a conception of freedom worth embracing.
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………….….………... ii
INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………………..………….. 1
I. DEFINITIONS ………………………………………………..…………………….………... 5
II. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY AS A TRIADIC RELATION……………...…….. 7
III. AN INTRODUCTION TO REPUBLICAN FREEDOM …………………………...……… 9
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE REPUBLICAN CLAIM …………………………….....……….. 11
IV.A. ELIZABETH ANDERSON’S “MARIA CASE” …………………...………..…...…….. 11
IV.B. A SYSTEM OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LIBERTY PROTECTS PROPERTY
RIGHTS ………………………………………………………………...………………..……. 13
IV.C. A SYSTEM OF POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LIBERTY PROTECTS INALIENABLE
RIGHTS ……………………………………………………………...…………………….….. 19
IV.D. NON-DOMINATION IS INSUFFICIENT FOR ASSESSING FREEDOM-REDUCING
SITUATIONS, A RESPONSE TO LOVETT ………………………...……………………….. 24
IV.E. LOVETT’S EXAMPLES ARE FULLY EXPLAINED BY A SYSTEM OF NEGATIVE
AND POSITIVE LIBERTY ……………………………………………..…………….……… 25
IV.F. THE INESCAPABLE AMBIGUITY OF REPUBLICAN FREEDOM AND WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE SUITABLY CONTROLLED …………………...…...…………………...…. 31
V. ON BERLIN AND MILL ………………………………………………………………….. 34
V.A. BERLIN’S CLASSICAL LIBERAL CLAIM IS CONCEPTUALLY AND
HISTORICALLY INACCURATE ………………………………..………………………..…. 34
V.B. MILL IMPLICITLY EMBRACED THE TRIADIC CONCEPTION OF
iii

FREEDOM………………………………………………………………………………….....35
CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………………… 37
BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………………………………… 38
VITA …………………………………………………………………………………………. 41

iv

INTRODUCTION
In 1958, Isaiah Berlin explicitly stated the difference between positive and negative
liberty, positing political implications which sparked much discourse and debate about the
importance of these two conceptions, their compatibility (or lack thereof), and how they can be
promoted or diminished. Positive and negative liberty are often thought of as two incompatible
interpretations of the same ideal, which jointly provide a complete interpretation of the concept
of freedom.1 In 1997, however, Philip Pettit proposed a third notion that is now known as a
“republican” conception of freedom. This, put shortly, is freedom from non-domination, and
negative and positive freedom can be shortly defined, respectively, as freedom from interference
and having a rich set of opportunities accessible to oneself.2
In this essay I present a system in which negative and positive freedom are working
together as compatible conceptions of a single concept of freedom which I believe provides the
best analysis for recognizing and promoting freedom in society. They are specifications of
freedom understood as a triadic relationship between an agent, certain preventing conditions, and
certain doings or becomings of the agent3 which can better account for our views on freedom. In
order to bolster my argument for a system of positive and negative liberty, I must refute the
notion of republican freedom as it holds that negative and positive freedom do not make up a

1

Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, August 2,
2016. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/.
2
Anderson, Elizabeth, “Freedom and Equality” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom, ed. David Schmidtz and Carmen
E Pavel, Oxford University Press (New York): 2018. Ebook. 122.
3
MacCallum, Gerald C. “Negative and Positive Freedom.” The Liberty Reader, 2017, 100–122.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315091822-6.
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complete conception of freedom. I explore different arguments of republican thinkers especially
from Elizabeth Anderson and Frank Lovett.
I ultimately reject republican freedom for the following reasons: 1) It is not relevantly
distinct from negative freedom in a meaningful way which can account for an entirely different
conception of freedom (rather it is a form of a negative conception of liberty). 2) A
non-domination condition of freedom can in one sense be far too narrow as it leads to many
interferences which I believe to be too freedom-reducing to be ignored in an analysis of freedom.
In another sense it can be far too broad as the republican qualifies domination as the ability to
control, and it seems there could always be a threat of domination. 3) Republican freedom
necessarily invites ambiguity as it does not provide a clear definition of “uncontrolled” ability
which is a flaw it cannot seem to escape. When freedom seems to be reliant on some sort of
outside constraint or constitutional limitation it seems to grant the government too much
authority on the definition of freedom. Upon assessing freedom, the analysis should be of the one
being oppressed and on the actual interference and not placed on the conditions of the oppressor.
4) Republicans confuse actual freedom with the security of that freedom. If anything, republican
freedom is theorizing on how to preserve negative freedom, so it is not a conceptually distinct
theory of freedom.
Once liberty is accurately and sufficiently viewed to include both negative and positive
conceptions of freedom, one can see that there is nothing more which republican freedom can
bring to the table; it is doing no normative work. I additionally point out that Isaiah Berlin, in an
attempt to promote only negative liberty, misattributed a wholly negative conception of liberty to
John Stuart Mill. In reality Mill has many notions of positive liberty in his theory. I maintain that
Berlin makes this mistake largely because he incorrectly thinks we should divide liberty into two

2

distinct, antagonistic concepts rather than complementary conceptions. So, upon reading Mill as
a proponent of only negative liberty, he missed out on key notions of Mill’s theory on liberty. It
is for these reasons that I believe freedom is not supposed to be cashed out in terms of an
opposing dichotomy, and negative and positive liberty can be thought of together to form a rich
system of freedom.
This essay will consist of six sections. In Section I, I provide definitions and examples of
positive liberty, negative liberty, and republican liberty. In Section II, I present a triadic system of
freedom which consists of an agent, certain preventing conditions, and certain doings or
becomings of the agent. This one concept of freedom effectively explains how the dichotomy
between positive and negative freedom is false.4 In Section III, I give a presentation of
republican freedom, and I describe its general strengths and the critiques it wages against both
the negative and positive freedom conceptions. In Section IV, I discuss why the general
republican claims are false and that non-domination does not need to be added to our analysis of
freedom (for this is merely an extreme lack of negative liberty). This section consists of five
subsections in which I discuss both main arguments from Anderson and Lovett. In Sections
IV.A-C I argue that republican and negative liberty are not as distinct as the republican states,
that Anderson’s king-citizen relationship example only shows that the citizen is not experiencing
negative freedom to the extent they should be.5 I also provide rebuttals to her argument that
republican liberty and positive liberty should be promoted over negative liberty in order to
defend property and inalienable rights.

4

MacCallum, Gerald C. “Negative and Positive Freedom.” The Liberty Reader, 2017, 100–122.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315091822-6.
5
In this way I disagree with some who claim that one can experience full negative freedom under a totalitarian
government which allows one to live their day to day life as they please yet has control to kill, torture, or imprison
you at any moment.
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In Section IV.D-F, I further present aspects of Lovett’s non-domination argument. I
contend that there are circumstances in which domination is not occurring which should count as
unjustifiably freedom reducing and that positing that the condition of the ability to dominate can
be freedom reducing is too broad. Indeed it would be more beneficial to accept a negative
conception of liberty which can also posit, like the republican, that active arbitrary control (or
domination) is an interference in itself. It is best to accept that a promotion of a system of both
negative and positive liberty adequately assesses when situations are freedom reducing. I critique
three examples he uses to explain the non-domination condition: I maintain that the example of
minorities he uses to show that domination is not occurring certainly does show a lack of
freedom, I maintain that police interference should be able to count as freedom reducing, and I
maintain that his master-slave relationship and his defense of the “gentle giant” example do not
make a compelling case for republican freedom. I also highlight the ambiguity of the republican
condition of having “controlled” or “non-arbitrary” ability to control and problems that arise
from this. Finally, in Section V, I present Berlin’s argument against positive freedom and his use
of Mill in order to establish his point. I argue that he misreads Mill precisely because of his
mistaken ideology on how to view liberty, for John Stuart Mill’s theory certainly encompasses
aspects of both negative and positive liberty.

4

I. DEFINITIONS
I now provide explanations of each of these types of liberties including brief examples of
each; I recognize, however, that there are borderline cases. In fact, I believe that there could be
quite a lot of borderline cases within negative and positive liberty precisely because they are not
as antagonistic as many believe. For the sake of clarity, I focus on obvious and well agreed upon
examples of each.
Negative liberty according to Berlin is involved in answering the question “what is the
area within which the subject – a person or group of persons – is or should be left to do or be
what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?”6 Ian Carter in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines it as “the absence of obstacles, barriers, or constraints. One
has negative liberty to the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense…liberty
as the absence of obstacles external to the agent.”7 Within this conception of freedom the free
person need not be internally and externally able to and have the resources to execute a life plan,
rather it is the absence of outside interferences. So, I am free to go on a road trip, even if I cannot
afford it, so long as no one interferes with my ability to do so– such as placing roadblocks or
locking me in my room. If these interferences were to occur I would experience a lack of
negative liberty.

6

Berlin, Isaiah. “Two Concepts of Liberty.” Page 155.
https://jmaggio.typepad.com/no_call_me_jay/files/two_concepts_of_liberty.pdf, n.d.
7
Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Section 1.
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Positive liberty according to Berlin “derives from the wish on the part of the individual to
be his own master” and is involved in answering the question “what, or who, is the source of
control or interference, that can determine someone to do, or be, one thing rather than another?”8
Positive liberty is interested in freedom from internal constraint and in the possession of the
developed capacity to act on one’s free will. Carter defines it as “the possibility of acting — or
the fact of acting — in such a way as to take control of one's life and realize one's fundamental
purposes.”9 It can involve having both internal and external resources. Proponents of positive
freedom argue that “the pursuit of liberty understood as self-realization or as self-determination
can require state intervention of a kind not normally allowed by proponents of negative liberty.”10
For example, if I do not have money to buy groceries, then I lack positive freedom in this case.
Some argue that it is the government’s responsibility to help its citizens cultivate conditions to be
self-sufficient; it is on this basis that some defend a welfare state on positive liberty grounds.
Republican liberty, according to Pettit, is when “a person or group enjoys freedom to the
extent that no other person or group has the capacity to interfere in their affairs on an arbitrary
basis.”11 It is a conception of political liberty as “non-domination or independence from arbitrary
power” and it defines freedom as a sort of “structural independence—as the condition of not
being subject to the arbitrary or uncontrolled power of a master.”12 For example, one could be
said to lack republican liberty in a totalitarian state where one is seemingly not interfered with,
precisely because one is subject to this arbitrary power.

8

Berlin, Isaiah. “Two Concepts of Liberty.” Arguments for Freedom. Page 155.
Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016. Introduction.
10
Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016. Introduction.
11
Lovett, Frank, "Republicanism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), Section 1.2. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/republicanism/>.
12
Lovett, Frank, "Republicanism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018. Introduction.
9
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II. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY AS A TRIADIC RELATION
We should not assume, as Berlin does, that negative and positive liberty are two distinct
antagonistic kinds of liberty.13 It appears rather to be two conceptions of the same thing– a single
concept, that includes aspects of both “freedom from” and “freedom to” conditions. Gerald
MacCallum argues that Berlin has created a false dichotomy and that there are actually many
different possible interpretations of freedom.14 I maintain that positive and negative liberty
wholly constitute freedom, and therefore deny that there are many types of freedom which can fit
into this triad. MacCallum is certainly correct that a false dichotomy has been created, however,
the distinctions between positive and negative liberty help better assess situations and identify
the function of liberty. The following is MacCallum’s presentation of the triad:
Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always
freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to
doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something. Such freedom is thus
always of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do, not do, become,
or not become something; it is a triadic relation. Taking the format "x is (is not)
free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z," x ranges over agents, y ranges
over such "preventing conditions" as constraints, restrictions, interferences, and
barriers, and z ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance.15
So, common disputes about liberty are actually disagreements on the extent and appropriateness
of ranges of variables x, y, and z.16 I explain this further in the following paragraph.

13

Carter, Ian, "Positive and Negative Liberty." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2022).
Introduction.
14
Carter, Ian, "Positive and Negative Liberty." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2022). Section 4.
15
MacCallum, Gerald C. "Negative and Positive Freedom." The Philosophical Review 76, no. 3 (1967): Page 314.
Accessed April 27, 2021. doi:10.2307/2183622.
16
Habibi, Don A. “The Positive / Negative Liberty Distinction and J.S. Mill’s Theory of Liberty.” ARSP: Archiv Für
Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 81, no. 3 (1995): Page 356.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23680705.
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MacCallum asserts that what the positive and negative liberty proponents differ over is
the way in which one should interpret each of the three variables in the one and only triadic
freedom-relation. Ian Carter puts forth the following example: Consider a nicotine addict who
has a specific destination but instead goes in the opposite direction in order to buy a cigarette.
When making a determination about if the nicotine addict is free or unfree, we are making
assumptions about each of the three variables.17 To say they are free would probably mean that
they are free from obstructions to do what they would like to do. To say they are not free would
mean that they are not free from internal constraints to act on their rational plan. In both claims
there are indeed aspects of positive and negative elements, which shows that the dichotomy
between negative and positive liberty is false.18
While MacCallum believes it is misleading to divide these two different interpreters as
either positive or negative proponents,19 I believe that adopting this language can be beneficial
once we realize that positive and negative freedom are two non-antagonistic concepts of the one
triadic relation which can work together to form the whole concept of freedom. This system
should be recognized in order to adequately assess freedom, which is precisely why I argue that
the republican claim that something more is needed than positive and negative liberty is false. I
maintain that republican freedom is not able to add anything to this triadic conception of liberty,
and thus is a spare wheel.

17

Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016. Section 4.
Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016. Section 4.
19
Ibid.
18
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III. AN INTRODUCTION TO REPUBLICAN FREEDOM
The general claim of republican thinkers is that while both negative and positive freedom
may be valuable, they are in no way sufficient for protecting citizens. So, the republican notion
of non-domination has to either replace positive liberty or negative liberty, or both, or be added
to them in order to provide a sufficient defense of citizens’ core interests and rights. On face
value republican freedom seems attractive for many reasons. It claims to go “further” than
negative liberty because it guarantees conditions which produce freedom from interference.20 In
addition, it appears to be straightforward, not demanding a need for self-control or any additional
form of outside aid as does positive liberty. It merely requires absence– “the absence of any
structural dependence on arbitrary power or domination.”21 Lovett admits that republicans are
not agreed on how to “specify the sort of control necessary to control freedom,”22 yet I take the
lack of arbitrary power or need of constraint to mean some sort of constitutional restriction is in
place in which such non-interference is guaranteed.23 The claim is that a dominated person, such
as a slave, can be non-interfered with if that is what the slave-owner chooses. However, because
the slave is dominated and is subjugated to the arbitrary power of his owner as he can revoke his
decision at any time, he is not actually free. Indeed, this is often how the republican distinguishes
themselves from the proponents of negative liberty.

20

Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.
Lovett, Frank. “Republicanism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018. Section 1.3.
22
Lovett , Frank. “Non-Domination.” In The Oxford Handbook of Freedom, ed. David Schmidtz and Carmen Pavel.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018. Ebook: Page 162.
23
Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2016.
21
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A common accusation against positive liberty, which highlights the freedom “to” do
things opposed to freedom “from” things, is that it can have oppressive consequences and
dangers of authoritarianism.24 Indeed, some feel it could lead to authority forcing individuals to
follow specific courses of action with the correct motive because this is believed to be the best
course for the individual’s self-realization and doing this would increase their freedom; this line
of reasoning also increases fear of indoctrination.25 In addition, there is the paradox of positive
freedom. This is the claim that under positive freedom one could paradoxically increase one’s
freedom if one simply desired fewer of the things they were unable to do. If being free meant
being unprevented internally or externally from realizing one's desires, then one could, again
paradoxically, reduce one's unfreedom by coming to desire fewer of the things one is unfree to
do. Republicanism maintains that its view avoids problems such as these because there is a focus
on the external (rather than internal, such as in positive liberty) realm of which people act;26 so,
freedom is not directly attached to what you desire.

24

Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Section 2.
Don A. Habibi maintains that these worries presented by Berlin are not worries of a pure positive liberty stance,
but a worry of the polluted and abused concept which does not portray true liberty. See “The Positive/Negative
Liberty Distinction and J.S. Mill’s Theory of Liberty.”
26
Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Section 2.
25
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IV. THE FAILURE OF THE REPUBLICAN CLAIM
In this section I demonstrate how after careful analysis of key republican claims for the
necessity of adding non-domination to our conception of freedom, we can see that their
arguments are flawed and that republican freedom brings nothing necessary to the table. Sections
IV.A-C are in response to Elizabeth Anderson’s essay “Freedom and Equality” and Sections
IV.D-F are in response to Frank Lovett’s essay “Non-Domination.”
IV.A. ELIZABETH ANDERSON’S “MARIA CASE”
Many republicans highlight a “kindly-master” scenario in order to distinguish between
negative and republican freedom and attempt to demonstrate that non-interference is not capable
of explaining crucial instances of freedom and unfreedom. Elizabeth Anderson asserts that
concepts of liberty (positive, negative, and republican) can work together, but they are logically
distinct. So, two concepts can work together at the cost of the third. For example, she claims that
Maria could have high degrees of negative and positive freedom yet lack republican freedom.
This would be the case if Maria is the favorite of a king who lavishes her in gifts which help her
advance her desires (which would account for the positive aspect of liberty) and allows her to say
and do as she pleases (which would account for the negative aspect of liberty), but who could
throw her in his dungeon whenever he likes. Anderson maintains that Maria would lack
republican freedom because the king is dominating her. I, however, assert that Anderson’s
“Maria Case” is fully explained by negative liberty.
I would like to briefly state that I do agree with Anderson on several fronts. First, I
obviously agree that we can think of positive and negative liberty in terms of working together.
11

However, I do not think that this occurs at a cost of republican freedom, because I do not believe
there are any other conceptions needed in the concept of freedom. Second, I agree, as I will show
below, that people who can achieve their goals only through the “mercy” of a dominator should
be seen as less free than people who can achieve their goals unconditionally (for example, not
having to be in a master’s good graces).27 In addition, I agree that a person should not be seen as
free merely on the probability of not being constrained from performing certain acts in the future.
Some proponents of negative liberty bite this “probability” bullet; what I mean is that
they say freedom at times relies on the probability of not being interfered with in the future, even
if it is not a current interference.28 I, however, do not find this move to be necessary. For if one
lacks the status of “free” person, I believe this to be a direct interference to their negative liberty.
I also find this to be one of the strengths of negative liberty, for it has the ability to be nuanced in
a way which non-domination is not. One can experience more or less negative liberty, however it
seems that one is either dominated or not, which makes the standard of freedom through the lens
of non-domination too narrow.
Ultimately, there is no concrete distinction between republican and negative liberty,
because domination is merely a type of extreme interference. So, in this case Maria is
experiencing a lack in negative liberty. That is, Maria is not experiencing negative liberty to its
full extent, which I briefly explain in the next paragraph. Further, as I have stated, freedom is a
system of both positive and negative liberty. One should have the positive liberty to be one’s own
master, and in order to do this one must have freedom from this being interfered with, such as
freedom from another master who could at any time choose to interfere with you.

27

Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. Section
3.2
28
Ian Carter makes this move, for example.
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Philip Pettit claims the difference between negative and republican freedom is that when
a dominator could (such as a lack of a structural constitution) but chooses not to interfere with
subordinates the republican can still count this as a lack of freedom, whereas a negative liberty
proponent could not.29 It seems, however, that as long as a direct door is closed to Maria (not
being able to remove herself from the king’s rule) she directly lacks negative freedom, precisely
because she is being interfered with. Maria has one less option than if the king were
“structurally” constrained in the relevant way, and she has less negative freedom than if she had
the option to remove herself from the king’s rule. So, she might enjoy more freedom in the
negative sense than someone who has all of her choices frustrated, however, Maria still lacks
freedom. Again, there seems to be no reason to think negative freedom cannot occur in degrees
or on a spectrum.30 I expound on this argument in Section IV.E while responding to Frank Lovett.
In this next section I demonstrate that contra Elizabeth Anderson, republican liberty does not add
to the case for property rights, which are often thought integral to freedom.
IV.B. A SYSTEM OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY PROTECTS PROPERTY
RIGHTS
Anderson presents her promotion of republican freedom (and positive freedom) largely
through thinking about property rights. She believes that a negative liberty proponent cannot
defend property rights justified through freedom.31 Contrary to what Anderson argues, I maintain
that property rights can be fully protected with a system of negative and positive liberties. An
attractive account of freedom and equality rejects strict material equality. It allows for property
rights that can only be justified in terms of republican and positive liberty, not negative liberty.32
29

Carter, Ian. “Positive and Negative Liberty.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Lovett, Frank. “Republicanism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Section 1.3.
31
Anderson, Elizabeth, “Freedom and Equality” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom, ed. David Smidtz and Carmen E
Pavel, Oxford University Press (New York): 2018. Ebook: 122.
32
Anderson, Elizabeth, “Freedom and Equality” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Ebook: 122.
30
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I, however, assert that positive liberty, promoted above (yet working with) negative liberty, can
adequately account for property rights.
Anderson believes this aforementioned strategy used by proponents of negative liberty to
support private property rights fails to secure freedom to individuals, because while securing the
individual negative freedom of one individual’s right to property you are constraining everyone
else’s negative freedom to own that same property.33 She states, “Rights entail that others have
correlative duties. To have a property right to something is to have a claim against others,
enforceable by the state, that they not act in particular ways with respect to that thing.”34 In this
way she believes a property right is a massive constraint on negative liberty as a whole, and that
negative freedom in respect to property is only capable of acknowledging privileges and not
rights.
Anderson makes a move which I find to be nothing less than arbitrary to help make her
point. In contravention of negative liberty proponents who embrace a moralized conception of
negative freedom, she states that we can only evaluate a non-moralized (or non-normative)
conception of freedom. Anderson thus rejects a normative conception of negative liberty that
involves the discussion of desirable freedoms in which “interference with others’ negative
freedom does not count as an infringement of liberty unless it is unjust.”35 She leaves negative
liberty to be thought of as purely descriptive as she defines it simply as “noninterference.”36
On the requirement of a non-moralized conception of freedom she states,
To base the justification of property rights on considerations of freedom itself, we
must regard freedom as a value or interest and not immediately as a right. That is,
we must regard freedom as a nonmoralized consideration. Otherwise we have no

33

Anderson, Elizabeth, “Freedom and Equality” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Ebook: 128.
Ibid.
35
Ibid. 129.
36
Anderson, Elizabeth, “Freedom and Equality” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Ebook: 122.
34
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basis in freedom for justifying property rights or resolving property disputes when
uses of property conflict.37
However, she gives republican and positive freedom normative definitions. She defines
republican freedom as not being “subject to another’s arbitrary and unaccountable will,” and
positive freedom as “a rich set of opportunities [which is] effectively accessible.”38 She also
states,
A contractualist framework can offer a freedom-based justification of private
property rights that departs from libertarian premises. In this picture, the
principles of right are whatever principles persons would rationally choose (or
could not reasonably reject) to govern their interpersonal claims, given that they
are, and understand themselves to be, free and equal in relation to one another…if
they chose a regime of privileges [then] meaningful opportunities would be rare.
By contrast, adoption of… extensive private property rights…would create vastly
richer opportunities for peaceful and cooperative production on terms of mutual
freedom and equality.39 (Emphasis added).
One can now see that she gives republican freedom and positive freedom normative aspects
(containing desirable freedoms) but leaves negative freedom to be purely descriptive. This, of
course, will put negative liberty at an unfair disadvantage. For I am not interested in defending a
purely descriptive form of negative liberty but rather a normative concept. Ralf Bader states that
“rights-based accounts moralize liberty…[yet] moralizing liberty is not tantamount to adopting a
positive conception.”40 His point is that moralizing liberty does not mean we need to abandon
negative liberty.
In order to defend the loss of negative liberty and to secure a “freedom-based” defense of
property rights, Anderson incorrectly claims that an appeal to positive and republican freedom
over negative freedom is necessary. Ultimately, according to Anderson, the best way to maintain
both property rights and inalienable rights based on a “freedom-based” defense is first and
37

Ibid. 130.
Ibid. 122.
39
Ibid. 130.
40
Bader, Ralf, “Moralized Conceptions of Liberty.” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom, ed. David Schmidtz and
Carmen E Pavel, Oxford University Press (New York): 2018. Ebook. 84.
38
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foremost through the promotion of republican freedom (rather than positive freedom) over
negative liberty. During the discussion of promoting either republican or positive freedom over
negative, Anderson appears charitable to the positive freedom perspective. She states that there is
a possibility that property rights can be recognized through positive liberty, “Someone who has
invested their labor in some external good with the aim of creating something worth more than
the original raw materials has a vital interest in assurance that they will have effective access to
this good in the future.”41 In this way they have positive freedom to have that good secured (even
at the cost of negative liberty).
As stated, in order for a freedom-based argument of property rights to be successful
Anderson maintains that positive and republican freedom must override negative liberty
interests,42 and she promotes republican over positive freedom in the interest of securing property
rights and sustaining a free society over time.43 On republican freedom overriding negative
freedom Anderson states:
Because individuals need access to external goods to survive, the stronger could
then condition others’ access on their subjection to the possessors’ arbitrary will.
Only a system of private property rights can protect the weaker from domination
by the stronger. The republican argument for rights in one’s own body follows
even more immediately from such considerations, since to be an object of others’
possession is per se to be dominated by them.44
Anderson believes that republican freedom can immediately begin to remedy the problem which
the promotion of negative freedom can produce. Indeed, she believes that the problem that the
nature of property rights and maintaining freedom poses can best be solved by appealing to
republican liberty.

41

Anderson, Elizabeth, “Freedom and Equality” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Ebook: 121.
Ibid. 129.
43
Ibid. 122.
44
Ibid. 121.
42

16

I concur that there is a need for more than just negative liberty when defending property
rights, yet adding a non-domination distinction in place of a non-interference distinction does not
further this aim. As I have pointed out there seems to be no clear distinction between republican
and negative liberty, as republican freedom is reducible to negative freedom. In addition, it
seems that positive liberty, promoted above yet working with negative liberty, can adequately
help remedy this situation, given precisely the reasons stated in the aforementioned paragraph,
such as a positive freedom to secure a good in which one has invested their labor.
Indeed, a republican notion of freedom is so indifferentiable from negative liberty that
Anderson inadvertently advocates for a system of negative and positive liberty as opposed to
republican and positive liberty. Anderson states, “The critical point is to institute a scheme of
individual rights that can sustain relations of freedom and equality—understood as personal
independence and non domination—among persons.”45 I believe that this exact idea can be
preserved through positive and negative liberty. It is preserved through positive liberty in the
sense that one seems to need personal independence in order to act upon one's free will and one
needs a rich set of opportunities in order to be free– certainly individuals need access to external
goods to survive, as states Anderson. In addition, there can be an argument made in favor of
positive freedom as there is a common interest in an acknowledgment of rights to property of the
individual. Anderson’s idea is also preserved through negative liberty because non-interference
covers non-domination. Indeed, her position reduces to the claim that only if certain
interferences are forbidden and certain resources guaranteed, can we be free. Ultimately this is a
discussion about positive and negative liberty.
When recognizing property rights, certain “interferences” are bound to happen because
not everyone can have the same property, but this is not an infringement of freedom in the
45
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normative sense. Negative liberty, in the normative sense, depends on the restraint of others.
Bader states, “only rights-violating interferences infringe liberty, whereas preventing someone
from doing something that person does not have a right to do does not restrict freedom [in a
normative sense],” instead it “restricts license.” When in a community of moral equals, one must
recognize that it is permissible to claim some space for yourself and your permissible pursuits
but that you also must leave space for others.46 It is in this way that one stops interference
(negative liberty) with your right to obtain property and allows others to pursue their goals as
well (positive liberty).
Indeed, the republican standard for lack of freedom which is “domination” is much too
high. It is more freedom-promoting to claim that property rights should be acknowledged on the
basis of stopping your freedom from being reduced by others and to stop interferences from the
stronger upon the weaker (even if it does not reach to the level of domination). However,
negative liberty should not override positive liberty. Property rights should be acknowledged in
respect to the common interest so that the liberty of the individual does not override the common
interest, therefore producing more positive freedom for all: “The infrastructure of private
property rights is a public good, justified by its promotion of opportunities- of positive freedom–
for all.”47 I have made an argument as to why this promotion of positive freedom does not occur
at the cost of negative liberty, precisely because I am discussing a normative conception of
freedom, according to which restriction of liberty in the descriptive sense does not entail a loss of
liberty in the politically significant sense.
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By advocating for republican freedom, Anderson is essentially claiming that because
negative liberty does not permit you to be interfered with, the concept is too restrictive. Her line
of reasoning can be traced as follows: For the sake of property rights which are essential to
freedom, if nothing else, we need to allow people to be interfered with; therefore, we should
change the standard of freedom from not being interfered with to not being dominated. This
conclusion, of course, is reached because she has denied a normative conception to negative
liberty. When we define negative liberty normatively we find that it is integral to property rights.
It provides a basis for not allowing others to interfere with someone in various ways which
non-domination does not. This attends in a better way to Anderson’s worry about the stronger
dominating the weaker, because the “weaker” in this case now has a strong interference defense.
In addition, this non-domination condition appears to grant the government the ability to analyze
and accept a plethora of different actions which would have previously been ruled out on the
basis of interference, especially since in many cases it is the government which is placing the
needed constraints which stops interference from being considered domination.
IV.C. A SYSTEM OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY PROTECTS INALIENABLE
RIGHTS
Anderson incorrectly asserts that in order to secure inalienable rights one must recognize
republican freedom, because inalienable rights can neither be secured through positive nor
negative liberty. Anderson believes that rights which are needed in order to sustain a society “in
which individuals relate to each other as free persons” involve the ability to “exercise
independent agency” and are necessarily inalienable, “so that no one becomes subject to
another’s domination.”48 I take her argument to be the following: 1) We need inalienable rights in
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order to preserve a freedom-based defense of rights. 2) Inalienable rights are grounded
exclusively on considerations of republican freedom. 3) Therefore, when making a
freedom-based defense of rights, one must appeal to republican freedom instead of positive or
negative freedom. I deny premise two. I believe she underestimates both the power of positive
freedom and the scope of interference for which negative liberty accounts.
She believes negative freedom is unable to secure inalienable rights for two reasons.
First, when negative freedom is valued higher than republican freedom, or in other words, when
non-interference is valued higher than non-domination, she argues that it will lead to a
contractual alienability of rights,49 in which one could, for example, enter a voluntary contract
into slavery. Anderson believes that contractual alienability of rights is not a stable structure to
produce a society which is free, yet she does not clearly show how this is only avoided through
her definition of republican freedom. Second, she argues that negative freedom cannot secure
inalienable rights because the nature of inalienable rights is necessarily a constraint on negative
freedom. In order to make this point she states, “If Sarah’s right is inalienable, then she is
immune from anyone changing her right…it entails that she is disabled from changing her own
right…this is a constraint on her higher order negative liberty...the liberty over the right itself.”50
It seems that this is not a normative conception of negative liberty. For it should only count as a
legitimate interference if the interference is unjust.
According to Anderson, a full system of alienable rights threatens the ability of workers
to maintain their freedom:
Living under conditions of bondage makes people servile, humble, and
psychologically dependent– psychological dispositions that they are likely to
transmit to their children. Servile people lack a vivid conception of themselves as
rights-bearers and lack the assertiveness needed to vindicate their rights… A free
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society cannot be sustained by people trained to servility and locked into strategic
games where some individuals’ alienation of their liberty rights puts others’
liberties at risk.51
It would follow then that interferences which are placed in order to stop the aforementioned
conditions should not be considered unjust. Therefore, this would not be a lack of negative
liberty in a normative sense.
Anderson also makes an argument as to why positive freedom cannot secure inalienable
rights. She claims that to have an inalienable right means that one cannot “exchange” it for rights
one values more, and so an inalienable right at times can reduce one’s opportunities and thus
reduce one’s positive freedom.52 For example, I cannot exchange my right to worship or right to
refrain from worshiping for the right to vote. This is because an inalienable right is non
transferable by nature. It is in this way that Anderson believes an inalienable right decreases
one’s positive freedom, because it decreases the amount of opportunities one has, such as when
forging contracts. Therefore, she believes that we cannot secure inalienable rights through
positive liberty.
Anderson admits, however, that in some cases having inalienable rights produces better
opportunities and, therefore, increases positive freedom. She gives the example of Michelle
drowning. If Peter is trying to place conditions on his saving Michelle, Michelle’s inalienable
rights will protect her from making some agreements such as subjecting herself to slavery. In this
way an inalienable right has produced better opportunities for her. This is one of the reasons that
I remain unconvinced that an inalienable right is incompatible with or completely reduces one’s
positive liberty.
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Additionally, this seems like an odd way to think about rights and freedom. It seems that
although inalienable rights are always there, it does not mean they cannot be ignored or that
one’s decision making is bound by one’s inalienable rights. What I mean is that the option or
opportunity for Michelle to choose to violate her inalienable right is there whether she chooses to
or not. Some might say that of course we can increase positive freedom by allowing a violation
of rights, but we ought to refrain as this would result in being less free. In other words, if
Michelle allowed for a violation of her inalienable right, she would increase her positive freedom
but she would be less free overall. So, could it be that the opportunity to violate her right is
always there, thus her positive freedom is not actually lacking? So it would simply be that
deciding to act in a way which violates one’s inalienable right would immediately decrease one’s
negative liberty, as now only an interference is occurring. It seems then that inalienable rights do
not actually decrease one’s positive liberty.
Even if this is not the case, it seems that if we are focused on a normative conception of
positive liberty, we should think in terms of “whatever principles persons would rationally
choose (or could not reasonably reject) to govern their interpersonal claims.”53 Being deprived of
a positive liberty in a purely descriptive sense of positive liberty (for example, the power to
alienate inalienable rights) does not limit positive liberty of the sort that matters– it is not a lack
of positive liberty in the normative sense. Therefore, I maintain that upholding an inalienable
right does not directly result in less positive liberty. There, again, is a positive liberty argument to
be made for inalienable rights which appeals to the common interest of people. For one has a
stake in other people’s liberty rights being secure against invasion by others. This is a “public
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infrastructure of freedom,” which depends on inalienable rights54 and is an example of how
inalienable rights can be acknowledged without a direct appeal to non-domination.
I argue that republican freedom is not providing us with anything that positive and
negative freedom cannot, and further, republican freedom can at times be too narrow to ground
inalienable rights. Let us think about the formal rights of workers. Workers have inalienable
rights against certain treatments, such as against the degrading treatment of sexual harassment.55
If Vivian is experiencing interference with her ability to do the work she sets out to accomplish
due to sexual remarks from her co-worker Steve, Vivian has an appeal to both a negative and
positive liberty defense. However, if Steve’s ability to interfere with Vivian is controlled (let us
say he has received three verbal warnings and has been sent home from work early twice) in
accordance with a policy which is an official constraint on his ability to act, Vivian does not have
an appeal to a republican liberty defense, because she is not being dominated. Since Steve does
not have the uncontrolled ability to intentionally frustrate Vivian’s workday, he is not decreasing
her republican liberty. A discussion of this definition of republican freedom is continued in the
next section.
Ultimately, an appeal to non-domination is valid, it is just wholly covered by negative
liberty, and non-domination is not the only grounds for inalienable rights. Indeed, appeals to both
negative and positive liberty (in the normative sense) are sufficient grounds for protecting
inalienable rights. Anderson says, “the rights most fundamental to the ability to exercise
independent agency [must] be inalienable, so that no one becomes subject to another’s
domination.” Her argument is still reducible to a system of negative and positive liberty.
Inalienable rights are able to increase positive liberty by allowing us to exercise independent
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agency and increase negative liberty by making sure we are not being interfered with in an unjust
way, and thus they are accounted for by negative and positive liberty.

24

IV.D. NON-DOMINATION IS INSUFFICIENT FOR ASSESSING FREEDOM-REDUCING
SITUATIONS, A RESPONSE TO LOVETT
Determining freedom and freedom reduction based on hindrances in relation to
domination is much too narrow. I will respond to Lovett’s argument in order to make my point. I
would first like to point out again that the conceptions of freedom which are being discussed are
complementary in nature. In order to have freedom “to” (an exercise conception of freedom)
must not you also have a freedom “from” obstacles (an opportunity conception of freedom)? The
republican claims that hindrances based on relationships of domination are what reduce
freedom.56 I disagree with this conception of freedom because it is far too narrow. That is, I
maintain that one’s freedom can be restricted even in circumstances where you are not being
dominated. This is demonstrated in my previous example with Vivian. Lovett aims to show that a
republican idea of freedom does not narrow the scope of freedom too much, and that it is distinct
from non-interference or negative freedom.
Lovett presents both the non-interference condition (negative freedom) and the
non-domination condition (republican freedom). The non-interference condition is: A is not free
to Φ if some B intentionally frustrates A’s Φ-ing. The non-domination condition is: A is not free
to Φ if some B has the uncontrolled ability to intentionally frustrate A’s Φ-ing. In defending that
non-domination is distinct from non-interference he states that interference is an action and
non-domination is an ability to act. I see major issues with this claim. Indeed in one sense it is far
too narrow and in another sense it is far too broad.
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What we consider lack of republican freedom is too broad in the fact that it consists in the
dominator’s ability to act. Losing freedom simply because someone has the uncontrolled ability
to frustrate your intentions clearly holds severe implications. There is always a possibility that
someone could dominate someone else in some sphere. This would mean that nearly everyone is
subject to domination and unable to participate in republican freedom because you are not truly
free, just free for now.57 In this way it has the ability to equate me or you, who are seemingly
un-dominated, to a servant who is being directly dominated. Freedom, then, is defined by not
having the possibility of being interfered with, which is surely a very high bar to achieve and
may even be virtually impossible.58 I delve further into this discussion in the following section.
Perhaps some might claim this argument is uncharitable and say under conditions of
republican freedom it must consist in an immediate threat of domination in order to be
considered a lack of freedom and therefore does not overly broaden the scope. Yet, when we only
think of freedom under terms of immediate threat of domination, the scope of unfreedom
becomes too narrow because of the nature of its conditions and the fact that it changes the
stipulation of freedom from non-interference to the more narrow non-domination.59
IV.E. LOVETT’S EXAMPLES ARE ALL FULLY EXPLAINED BY A COMBINATION OF
NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY
Lovett aims to prove that a non-domination view of freedom is not too narrow. Many
believe it is too narrow because it requires both an agent of domination and the agent has to have
the ability to frustrate choices intentionally. He begins his defense of republican freedom and his
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assertion that it is not too narrow by presenting an example of an incident where domination is
not occurring:
While existing civil rights legislation no doubt sometimes fails to protect specific
individuals from uncontrolled interference in specific instances, such failures are
no longer the primary cause of the persistent disadvantages faced by poor
minorities as a whole. These disadvantages stem rather from systemic factors,
such as residential housing patterns which divorce poor minorities from good
schools and good jobs. Surely, one is tempted to say, poor minorities are
dominated by these circumstances, even if they are merely the unintended
consequence of various structural features of American society. 60
He contends that disadvantages of this sort which he calls “unintended structural disadvantage”
does not land in the realm of domination. I maintain that this is because little does land in the
domination realm, although this is a clear example of persons experiencing lack of freedom.
As a society we should recognize that oftentimes people of this background do not have
the opportunity to experience freedom to the extent that the majority do, precisely because of
circumstances such as these. A positive notion of freedom can help adequately account for
situations such as these because it recognizes “freedom to pursue.” One needs the realized
capacity to pursue their desires before they can pursue them; while this is not always possible to
account for politically, in situations like this it is. Indeed, positive liberty allows for a
government to aim at actively creating the conditions necessary for individuals to be
self-sufficient or to achieve self-realization, creating a nice defense of policies such as welfare.61
Moving on to another example, Lovett states that under republican freedom police do not
detract from freedom because the ability of the police to issue coercive threats is controlled by
the judicial system, and therefore it is “suitably controlled.”33 This, however, is precisely why we
should have a non-interference stipulation as opposed to non-domination. Why should we think
the police cannot detract from our freedom simply because there is a judicial system above
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them? This does not seem like an inherently bad thing, rather it seems somewhat necessary in
order to have a cohesive society. However, there seems to be many circumstances in which
police could infringe on our freedom in a normative sense, while they are under the control of the
judicial system which enforces rules which many believe to be just and assert that the police’s
ability has a high probability of being constrained.
Yet Lovett’s point, I believe unintentionally, implies that the police do not even possess
the ability to detract from people’s “republican” freedom, even when using their power in a way
which one could interpret as abuse, because their ability is effectively62 controlled by just rules.63
It seems that we should be able to consider an innocent person who is being placed in a neck
restraint by a cop as being dominated. There are certainly effective laws which constrain the
majority of cops from placing innocent people in a neck restraint, however, many have argued
that the laws which allow for cops to place citizens in a neck restraint, under certain conditions,
are just. It seems then that the cop who believes the innocent citizen is an offender is being
effectively controlled in a just way, and therefore the innocent citizen is not even capable of
being seen as dominated when placed in a neck restraint. Again, this bolsters the claim that
non-domination overly narrows the scope of freedom. I will admit that some might reply that this
is not the “correct” type of control. It is a problem of republican freedom nonetheless, as they
have not clearly defined what “suitably controlled ability” entails and insist on moving the
analysis off of the one being oppressed and place it on the conditions of the one oppressing.
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A system which is able to recognize that in every instance there is both negative and
positive freedom being assessed is better able to account for cases such as this. Sometimes police
detract from our ability to act in ways which we might desire, but this usually increases our
overall freedom. In most cases this detraction from our ability “to” is in the descriptive sense. In
some cases, however, the police detracting from our ability “to” certainly decreases our overall
normative freedom regardless of the type of control which is placed on police ability, and this is
better accounted for in a system of positive and negative freedom rather than under a condition
of republican freedom.
In addition, parallel to Anderson’s “Maria Case,” Lovett presents an example of a servant
whose master does not intentionally frustrate her choices. Lovett points out that it seems that she
still lacks freedom even though her choices are not being actively, intentionally frustrated. In an
attempt to pose objections and bolster his non-domination claim, he supposes that we could have
this intuition because her freedom from interference lacks security. Perhaps this is the case
because the master could always choose to interfere with her in the future. Next, I present
another argument from Lovett and then respond to both this one and the following.
Lovett presents an objection which is commonly raised to republicans with the intention
of responding to and getting the republican out of the dilemma it allegedly poses. He presents an
example in which a gentle giant co-exists with valley dwellers. The only thing limiting the gentle
giant’s power in this scenario is his own good nature; there is no outside constraint on his ability
to interfere with the valley dwellers. This would mean that the valley dwellers necessarily lack
republican freedom because the giant’s power is not being suitably controlled. If an evil wizard
passed through the valley and turned the gentle giant’s disposition into a mean one, which
resulted in the gentle giant interfering with the valley dwellers in a number of devious ways, the
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valley dwellers have not actually lost any freedom at all because they did not have any to lose.
This example can effectively display that we should not confuse external controls placed on
possible interferences as freedom itself. So, if one agrees that the valley dwellers had decreased
freedom after the interferences began, this would mean that “freedom cannot hinge on
domination.”64
Lovett responds in an attempt to save the republican from this critique. He states that our
aim should not be in establishing the meaning of “freedom” but rather in establishing “what sort
of freedom a well-ordered society should promote.”65 He believes that if merely lessening the
probability of interference is our public aim, then we ignore the harm of uncertainty itself. He
believes the proponent of negative liberty must be indifferent as to the means by which security
might be achieved, which he believes to be incorrect. Lovett states, “Surely the value of freedom,
at least in part, consists in our being able to plan our lives according to our own designs, with a
certain and clear knowledge of the parameters society will impose.”6667
He also does not believe the answer is in reducing interference uncertainty. He believes
that this leads to one “being indifferent as to the means by which security might be achieved.”68
For example, in a society which holds up a traditional patriarchal family law, one can reduce the
probability of husbands interfering with their wives by reducing the dependency of wives on
their husbands or by educating the husbands to be gentler with their spouses.69 Lovett’s point is
that it seems wrong not to favor one approach over the other, which he does not believe the
negative liberty proponent can avoid. He states, “Our public aim should be to purge relationships
of domination from society, not merely to ameliorate their effects. For our ideals to properly
64
65
66
67
68
69

Lovett, Frank, “Non-Domination.” The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. Ebook. 158.
Ibid. 158.
Ibid. 158.
This certainly has notions of positive freedom.
Ibid. 158.
Ibid.

30

align with our aims, freedom in the politically relevant sense must include non-domination.”70
According to Lovett, our aim should not be lessening the probability of interference or to reduce
interference uncertainty, rather it should recognize freedom on the basis of the impossibility of
interfering in an uncontrolled way. I return to the dangers of his “impossibility of interference”
stipulation in the following section.
It is now my aim to show that Lovett’s arguments do not act as a good defense of
republican freedom, specifically, as I believe that his arguments still ultimately remain reducible
to arguments for negative freedom and positive freedom. I agree with Lovett that it does not
seem possible to enjoy freedom to its fullest extent when subject to domination. Different
degrees of freedom exist in different scenarios, and interferences should be able to be identified
and weighed. The nature of slave-owning is domination. Domination, however, is a severe type
of interference. Berlin refers to negative liberty as an open door,71 and while we disagree on the
type of government that this allows, it seems that even a benevolent slave master has closed a
door to the servant, thus reducing his negative freedom. Indeed, as long as the servant (or wife or
valley dweller) is not free to allow herself to be removed from the arbitrary power of the master
(or husband or giant), she is being interfered with. In this way we see that domination is a type of
infringement accounted for within negative liberty, and negative liberty can explain the
unfreedom of the “lucky” slave.
Simply because one person is being interfered with more or less does not mean that when
the interference or domination (which is a type of interference) is lifted, they do not both enjoy
the freedom of this type of interference being lifted. Indeed it seems that negative liberty has
room to be nuanced and republican freedom is simply too high of a standard when talking about
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freedom-reducing acts– for as we see in the gentle giant example, you either are dominated or
you are not. Further, as I pointed out, some may claim that republicanism equates the dominated
servant with seemingly free people, as the ability to dominate could come from a number of
agents in a number of ways.
The conception of liberty that I have proposed is successful in mitigating problems such
as these because the negative conception only deems something as a lack of freedom when the
interference (being under the control of someone with arbitrary power) is current, as opposed to
losing freedom when anyone has the mere ability to intentionally frustrate your choices. Even if
some disagree, my aim is not to say that a defense of negative liberty is a sufficient defense of
liberty. Linking a non-interference condition with a condition that allows one to be their own
master, like positive freedom allows,72 certainly shows why a relation of negative and positive
freedom is what a society should aim to promote. Indeed, one cannot have positive liberty if they
do not have the ability to control their destiny and choose their own path.73 In order to be one’s
own master one must have freedom from being under someone else’s arbitrary rule. One can
certainly see how this encompassing theory adequately purges the relation of domination from
society, without the need for a recognition of republican freedom. I believe this discussion leads
us to ask the question of what the “suitably controlled ability” condition is doing for the
republican, such as in the gentle giant case, and this is the topic of the following section.
IV.F. THE INESCAPABLE AMBIGUITY OF REPUBLICAN FREEDOM AND WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE SUITABLY CONTROLLED
As alluded to in previous paragraphs and as Ian Carter points out, “the [republican]
requirement of impossibility of interference seems over demanding, as it is never completely
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impossible for others to constrain me.”74 This means that domination could be occurring at all
times, and I would necessarily lack republican freedom. Carter uses the example of getting
stabbed on your walk home, while not likely, it is still a possibility. The republican could respond
by reminding us of the stipulation of “control” in their definition of republican freedom. What
they mean is that it must be impossible for others to interfere with me (or in this case stab me)
with impunity– the exemption of consequences.75 Carter rightly points out how hard “impunity”
can be to define. At what point do we consider stabbings to be done with or without impunity? If
70% of stabbings lead to prosecution, does this mean no one can stab someone with impunity? It
seems that if we accept this republican stipulation of impunity, this would mean that if every
single stabbing is prosecuted, when someone does get stabbed they do not experience lack of
republican freedom because the perpetrator’s ability was suitably controlled. As we can see,
republican freedom has the ability to be both much too broad and much too narrow.
Let us assume that this “suitably controlled” clause found in republican freedom is
referring to constitutional limits. Does this mean that someone cannot be experiencing republican
freedom unless the government has placed adequate control on all individual’s and corporation’s
(and whomever else's) potential ability to interfere? I believe it is worrisome for freedom to be
directly dependent on the control the government does or does not implement. It certainly seems
that non-domination confuses actual freedom with the security of that freedom. A constitution
should not be equated to freedom, and I do not believe republican thinkers can escape this claim.
A constitutional constraint does not produce a different kind of freedom than if someone refuses
to interfere or dominate someone else based on their virtue. Consider a small society that is not
controlled by a government but is rather governed by customary rules which afford a high degree
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of what most would consider freedom. It certainly seems incorrect to say that these people are
unfree simply because there is no constitution in place. We can see from this example that the
existence of a constitution does not create an importantly different kind of freedom or
unfreedom. It seems that the government should be viewed instead as a means to preserving
positive and negative liberty, but the government should not be seen as a necessary condition to
having freedom.
Further, this stipulation is not as concrete as many republicans seem to think. Take for
example the concept of a living constitution. Some may claim that a living constitution is not a
substantive constraint on the state, and it allows the government to do whatever it needs to do to
help people realize themselves. It seems then that this could not do the work that republicans
need from a constitution. Assessing liberty would fall onto negative liberty terms, so in cases like
this, it is negative liberty which is doing the work of the claimed “republican” liberty.
Ultimately, republican freedom is working from within the confines of negative liberty or
from the negative liberty ideal and asking what it means to have control or constitutional limits
of the right kind.76 The republican is essentially asking what kind of policies best produce or
protect negative freedom. Carter writes, “Republican writers on freedom have…simply provided
good arguments to the effect that negative freedom is best promoted, on balance and over time,
through certain kinds of political institutions rather than others.” This endeavor does not however
make them distinct from negative liberty; in other words they are not offering “a conceptual
challenge to that ideal.”77
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V. ON BERLIN AND MILL
Many of the arguments I have examined have been focused on a critique of negative
liberty (although I have advocated for positive liberty as well) because many republicans view
negative liberty as their main target. Isaiah Berlin wholly rejects positive freedom which I
certainly believe to be a great error. In this section, I explain how Berlin views positive liberty as
completely unnecessary, and I demonstrate that he incorrectly uses John Stuart Mill in order to
further his point.
V.A. BERLIN’S CLASSICAL LIBERAL CLAIM IS CONCEPTUALLY AND
HISTORICALLY INACCURATE
Berlin argues that we need to distinguish negative freedom from positive freedom, and
then recognize, as did J.S. Mill, that negative freedom alone is sufficient for protecting citizens.
So, while republican freedom does not do any meaningful work in a conception of freedom,
much like an unneeded spare tire, positive freedom, according to Berlin, is a flat tire, and we
merely need to promote negative freedom. Berlin, like many others have done since, attributed a
negative conception of liberty to John Stuart Mill. Indeed, it does appear that Mill presents a
compelling case for negative freedom such as freedom from government interference and social
pressure.78 I argue that Berlin’s conception of freedom is mistaken, and portraying Mill as merely
a negative libertarian is inadequate. This is because liberty is a nuanced conception, and many
theories of freedom cannot either fit into positive or negative freedom alone. Indeed, Mill makes
use of both negative and positive liberty.79
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V.B. MILL IMPLICITLY EMBRACED THE TRIADIC CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM
I agree with Don Habibi’s claim that a triadic conception of liberty better accounts for
Mill’s social system by increasing our knowledge of the way in which freedom works. He argues
that Mill does not just employ both concepts of positive and negative liberty distinctly, but in a
way in which they are oftentimes interrelated.80 Indeed when Mill advocates for negative
freedom, such as his belief that freedom should not be interfered with unless their actions are
infringing on the rights of others, it is in order to create an environment in which the exercise of
positive freedom can occur. Habibi points out that in Chapter 2 of On Liberty Mill claims that
people should have freedom from government restrictions in order to “gather information, form
opinions, speak freely, exchange ideas, and move closer to the truth.”48 In Chapter 3 of On
Liberty he claims that people should have freedom from social restraints, so that they have the
ability to “cultivate their own personalities, pursue their diverse tastes, talents, desires, and
follow their own path toward improvement and self-realization.”81 This effectively incorporates
the internality aspect of positive liberty.
Mill has clear positive liberty claims such as when he states, “The only freedom which
deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way.”82 Habibi points out that
some have recognized the positive liberty aspects of his theory, yet have attributed it to his being
“inconsistent and muddled” such as in the case of Francis Garforth.83 Referring to Mill as
someone who incorporates positive liberty might indeed be surprising to some. However, he
even incorporates the “administrative elite” into his society, which could fulfill Berlin’s
definition of positive liberty in the way that he associates it with the belief that we experience
80
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our freedom through following the lead of experts who can show us the oath of reason and
truth.84
This is particularly interesting because Berlin, with this in mind, would not have to worry
about his fears of authoritarianism that elitism can lead to under Mill’s theory, precisely because
there is a balance of negative and positive liberty. A case of negative liberty balancing positive
liberty can be seen in his belief that there should be severe restrictions on the state’s role in
education. From Mill’s theory we see a triadic relation in practice in which an agent possesses
both negative and positive liberty. Indeed this is the type of liberty that a society should promote.
They complement and borrow from one another when necessary, and work together to defeat a
number of objections republican freedom simply cannot. If Berlin had not mistakenly broken up
liberty into two distinct, antagonistic conceptions, he might have avoided this misreading of Mill.
Indeed, the nature of freedom and what is being promoted is much better understood in terms of
a system of both positive and negative liberty which I have promoted.

84

Habibi, Don A. "The Positive / Negative Liberty Distinction and J.S. Mill's Theory of Liberty." Page 359.

37

CONCLUSION
In this essay I have responded to both Elizabeth Anderson and Frank Lovett’s defense of
republican freedom. I have argued that their theories fail to present a more compelling theory of
freedom than a system of positive and negative liberty. A republican conception of liberty fails
for several reasons. I demonstrated how the attempt to make a relevant distinction between
negative liberty and republican liberty was either not successful or led to ridiculous conclusions
such as that no one could truly obtain freedom. I pointed out that positing a non-domination
condition overly narrowed the conception of liberty and did not allow for some things to count as
freedom reducing which should, such as in the case with the police and the example of Vivian. I
pointed out how ambiguous the condition of being “suitably controlled” was and how
republicans have failed to make this clear. Finally, I showed how Berlin’s argument against
positive liberty fails, especially when he disregards the positive aspects of Mill’s philosophy. We
can most certainly better understand freedom and theories of freedom when we disregard the
idea that positive and negative liberty are distinct and antagonistic notions of freedom; indeed, a
well-rounded conception of liberty will encompass and promote both positive and negative
liberty.
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